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THE DEAD HAND LOSES ITS GRIP IN VIRGINIA: A NEW
RULE FOR TRUST AMENDMENT AND TERMINATION?*
[Qine of the strongest motives to industry and economy; one
of the highest excitements to the exercise of those duties
which make a valuable citizen, is a conviction that the ac-
quisitions of his frugality and enterprise, will be
transmitted as he may direct at his death to promote the
happiness of those who were dear to him in life.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The majority rule in America for the amendment and termi-
nation of trusts was first adopted in Claflin v. Claflin2 and
came to be known as the Claflin Doctrine. This rule states that
"a testator has a right to dispose of his own property with such
restrictions and limitations, not repugnant to law, as he sees
fit, and that his intentions ought to be carried out, unless they
contravene some positive rule of law, or are against public
policy."3 In effect, the Claflin Doctrine is codified in the Re-
statement (Second) of Trusts, which states that trust beneficia-
ries cannot compel a trust's premature termination or modifica-
tion unless 1) all beneficiaries consent (where none are incapac-
* This paper was selected as a winner of the 1995 McNeill Writing
Competition.
1. Heirs of Cole v. Cole's Executors, 7 Mart. (ns.) 414, 4-17 (La. 1829); see
James L. Arruebarrena, Casenote, Albritton v. Albritton: Trust Termination-The
Settlor's Intent is Indestructible, 38 LOY. L. REv. 1159 (1993).
2. 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889).
3. Id. at 456.
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itated), and 2) such termination or modification will not defeat
a material purpose of the trust.4 The Claflin Doctrine has been
the law in Virginia for some time.'
In 1991, however, the Virginia General Assembly passed
emergency legislation entitled Petition for Reformation of Trust
which is in direct opposition to the Claflin Doctrine.6 In effect,
it allows "a trustee, personal representative or beneficiary" to
petition for the amendment of a trust, "including... termi-
nating the trust and ordering distribution of the trust property
regardless of any spendthrift or similar protective provision."7
The only requirement for termination is that good cause be
shown.' The statute fails to require any consideration of the
settlor's intent, the material purposes of the trust, or the inter-
ests of the beneficiaries which may be negatively affected by
such termination. As a result, the common law Claflin Doctrine,
which has been enforced in Virginia for many years, is in dan-
ger of being completely disregarded by literalist judges who
may not be experienced in trust law.
Although the primary purpose of this statute was probably to
allow for the amendment or termination of trusts where chang-
es in tax laws or other circumstances may have caused hard-
ship under the original trust instrument,9 a literal reading of it
allows a court to disregard the settlor's intent and terminate
the trust to serve the beneficiaries' purposes. This conflict intro-
duces much uncertainty into Virginia estate planning and ef-
fectively destroys the trust as a stable device to transfer proper-
ty in accordance with the settlor's wishes. In fact, Professor
Johnson has suggested that, "[a]bsent remedial action to re-
strict the scope of this statute, it may be that the prudent Vir-
ginia attorney will be forced to create trusts under the laws of
other jurisdictions in order to insure that a client's legitimate
purposes will not be frustrated."0
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 (1959).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 36-52.
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.4 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
7. Id. § 55-19.4(A).
8. Id.
9. Section 55-19.4 replaced section 55-19.2 which had allowed the termination of
small trusts, where such termination would not cause the purposes of the trust to
fail.
10. J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Es-
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This comment will analyze the harm which can be done to a
settlor's intent where a trust amendment and termination stat-
ute is not applied narrowly. First, it will summarize the Ameri-
can history of trust amendment and termination in Part II.
Then, in Part IH, this article will track the progression of trust
amendment and termination specifically in Virginia. It will
examine the effect of similar legislation in Missouri in Part IV
as an example of what harm can result from a literalist inter-
pretation of this type of statute. Finally, in Part V, this com-
ment will provide a sample of possible solutions to trust
amendment and termination, and specifically to our problem in
Virginia.
II. HISTORY OF AMERICAN TRUST LAw REGARDING AMENDMENT
AND TERMINATION
A. The English Common Law Rule
Prior to the Claflin decision, American courts followed the
English common law rule for the amendment and termination
of trusts. This rule was based on the belief that all property
interests should be reasonably alienable, and beneficiaries
should be able to control their own property interests once the
settlor has surrendered them.' In other words, the English
were against the concept of "dead hand" control where, even
after death, the settlor continues to dictate the lives of his or
her beneficiaries through a trust instrument.
The English rule was originally established in Saunders v.
Vautier,' which held that if all adult beneficiaries consent and
are sui juris,"3 the court is required to terminate a trust with-
out regard to whether the settlor's material purposes may be
frustrated in the process. In addition, there are two parliamen-
tates, 25 U. RICH. L. REv. 925, 932-33 (1991).
11. See 4 AusTIN W. ScoTr & WaLim F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 337
(4th ed. 1987).
12. 49 Eng. 282, affd, 41 Eng. Rep. 482 (1841).
13. Sui juris is defined as "[o]f his own right; possessing full social and civil
rights; not under any legal disability, or the power of another, or guardianship. Hav-
ing capacity to manage one's own affairs; not under legal disability to act for one's
self." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1434 (6th ed. 1990).
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tary acts which control English law in this area. The first au-
thorizes the trustee to make administrative deviations if benefi-
cial to the trust as a whole." The second act authorizes dis-
tributive deviation without court intervention if all adult benefi-
ciaries who are sui juris consent. 5 An administrative deviation
is where the trustee deviates from the administrative or man-
agement provisions of a trust; for example, selling property that
otherwise would have been retained or making investments
that otherwise would have been improper under the trust's
express terms. A distributive deviation, on the other hand,
occurs where the trustee deviates from the express terms of the
trust regarding the identity of the beneficiaries or the distribu-
tion of trust proceeds. 7
B. The English and American Rules Part Company
In 1889, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts parted
company with the English common law rule. In Claftin v.
Claflin,5 the testator, Wilbur Claflin, created a trust in his
will for the benefit of his minor son, Adelbert. According to the
trust, Adelbert was to receive a third of his father's estate in
the following manner: $10,000 at age twenty-one; $10,000 at
age twenty-five; and the balance at age thirty.' After his
father's death, Adelbert received his first installment at age
twenty-one. He then brought suit, prior to age twenty-five, to
compel the trustees to pay him the remainder of his trust fund.
He contended that, according to English common law (which
American courts had followed to this point), the provisions of
the trust postponing payment beyond the time he reaches age
twenty-one were void. He argued that his interest was vested
and absolute, and authority was undisputed that restrictions
against the alienation of absolute interests in the income of
trust property were void.2°
14. Trustee Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 19, § 57 (Eng.).
15. English Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 53, § 1 (Eng.).
16. Gail B. Bird, Trust Termination: Unborn, Living, and Dead Hands-Too Many
Fingers in the Trust Pie, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 563, 588 (1985).
17. See id.
18. 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889).
19. Id. at 455.
20. Id.
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The court held, however, that the trust should not be termi-
nated, stating that "a testator has a right to dispose of his own
property with such restrictions and limitations, not repugnant
to law, as he sees fit, and that his intentions ought to be car-
ried out, unless they contravene some positive rule of law, or
are against public policy."2' The court added that
[t]he existing situation is one which the testator manifestly
had in mind, and made provision for. The strict execution of
the trust has not become impossible; the restriction upon
the plaintiffs possession and control is, we think, one that
the testator had a right to make; other provisions for the
plaintiff are contained in the will, apparently sufficient for
his support; and we see no good reason why the intention of
the testator should not be carried out.'
Therefore, the settlor's purpose became controlling in cases of
trust amendment and termination. American courts began to
follow the Claflin Doctrine, and it soon became the majority
rule.23 In fact, the United States Supreme Court gave its full
support to the Claflin Doctrine in Shelton v. King.24 The Court
stated,
[i]f the testatrix saw fit to have this fund accumulate in the
hands of trustees, and thereby postpone the enjoyment of
her gift, why shall her will be disregarded? .. .There is no
higher duty which rests upon a court than to carry out the
intentions of a testator when the provision is not repugnant
to settled principles of public policy and is otherwise val-
id.2
Moreover, the permanence of the Claflin Doctrine is apparent
by its codification in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts.26
In summary, the English and American majority rules dis-
agree regarding the control of property by the living and the
21. Id. at 456.
22. Id.
23. GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUST-
EES § 1008 (rev. 2d ed. 1983); ScoTT & FRATcHER, supra note 11, § 337; see RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 4.
24. 229 U.S. 90 (1913).
25. Id. at 95, 101.
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 4.
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dead. The English rule favors the control and free alienability
of property by the living, while the American rule favors the
testator's intent and freedom to dispose of their property as
they choose. In order to gain trust termination under the Eng-
lish rule, one must overcome only one hurdle: consent of all
beneficiaries, where they are all sui jurisY.2 Under the Ameri-
can rule, however, one must overcome the English hurdle plus
an additional requirement that the termination will not defeat
a material purpose of the settlor.2"
C. English and American Views on Spendthrift Trusts
Part of the reason for the difference between the English and
American rules originates in each country's view of spendthrift
trusts. A spendthrift trust is a trust "created with a view of
providing a fund for the maintenance of another, and at the
same time securing it against his own improvidence or incapaci-
ty for self-protection."29 In other words, the assets of a spend-
thrift trust may be neither voluntarily nor involuntarily alienat-
ed by the beneficiaries. Since this is in direct opposition to the
English view which favors the free alienation of property inter-
ests, English courts do not uphold spendthrift trusts and con-
sider them invalid. This English rule was first established in
Brandon v. Robinson. °
American courts, however, uphold spendthrift provisions as
valid restraints on alienation.3 ' Broadway National Bank v.
Adams12 was the decision which changed the direction of
American law regarding the validity of spendthrift trusts. The
Broadway 'court stated "that it would [not] violate any princi-
ples of sound public policy to permit a testator to give to the
object of his bounty such a qualified interest in the income of a
trust fund, and thus provide against the improvidence or mis-
fortune of the beneficiary."33 This approval of spendthrift
27. Saunders v. Vautier, 49 Eng. Rep. 282, aff'd, 41 Eng. Rep. 482 (1841).
28. Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454, 456 (Mass. 1889).
29. Wagner v. Wagner, 91 N.E. 66, 69 (Ill. 1910).
30. 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (Ch. 1811).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 152, 153, 330 cmt. e, illus. 1
(1959).
32. 133 Mass. 170 (1882).
33. Id. at 173.
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trusts was afirmed when the United States Supreme Court, in
Shelton v. King, announced that it was not against public policy
to bequeath property and restrict it from voluntary alienation
or the reach of creditors.' Given this approval of spendthrift
trusts by American courts, it is only natural for them to limit
the right to amend or terminate a trust as another valid re-
straint on alienation. Moreover, spendthrift trusts are viewed
by American courts as indestructible, as the beneficiaries can-
not compel the trustee to terminate such a trust premature-
ly.
35
IH. HISTORY OF VIRGINIA TRUST LAW REGARDING AMENDMENT
AND TERMINATION
A. Progression of the Claflin Doctrine in Virginia
In 1965, the Claflin Doctrine was upheld by the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia in Telephones, Inc. v. LaPrade."
In this case, the testator, Burgie Lee Fisher, worked his way
up in the telephone business from a small town telephone re-
pairman to become the owner of Lee Telephone Company." He
was quite a pioneer in the telephone industry, having installed
the first dial equipment system in Virginia in 1932, and having
received international recognition as the first in the world to
install a tandem dialing system." Fisher was proud of his
company and addressed his intentions regarding his company
stock specifically in his will. His will created a charitable trust
for several religious institutions from the residuary of his es-
tate. 9 This trust was discretionary, as the testator provided in
his will that his executors, "in their sole and absolute discre-
tion, and at such time and upon such terms and conditions as
to them shall seem best, are directed to sell" the stock.4"
34. 229 U.S. 90, 97 (1913).
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 31.
36. 206 Va. 388, 143 S.E.2d 853 (1965).
37. Id. at 392, 143 S.E.2d at 855-56.
38. Id. at 392, 143 S.E.2d at 856.
39. Id. at 393, 143 S.E.2d at 856.
40. Id. at 398, 143 S.E.2d at 859.
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The court upheld the executors' decision to sell the stock to a
third party other than that requested by the beneficial institu-
tions. The court stated,
[w]here, as here, no considerations of public policy are in-
volved, and the trust is active, rather than passive, the rule
that beneficiaries may demand delivery in kind of the res of
the trust estate and thus terminate the trust, must give
way to another principle of law. That principle is that
where the settlor expresses a clear intention that such de-
livery shall not take place and that such termination may
not be compelled by the beneficiaries, the courts are bound
to give effect to that expressed intention. Especially is this
true where, as here, the trustees are vested with broad
discretionary powers and there appears no abuse of discre-
tion in the exercise of those powers."
Therefore, even though all of the beneficiaries were sui juris
and consented, the court still found the testator's intent to be
controlling.
The Claflin Doctrine was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Virginia in 1984. In Schmucker v. Walker,42 the court upheld
the reasoning of LaPrade, stating that a trust could not be
prematurely terminated against the testator's expressed in-
tent.' In her will, the testator, Elizabeth Sawyer Walker, cre-
ated a trust which was to be terminated, and the proceeds dis-
tributed, upon the death or remarriage of one of the life benefi-
ciaries." In addition, like LaPrade, the trustee was given "full
discretionary powers of management" of the trust.' Thus, the
court held that the trust could not be terminated until the life
beneficiary either remarried or died, regardless of their consent
or the other beneficiaries' consent to termination.4 Moreover,
the court added another compelling reason against trust termi-
nation; it was actually impossible for all of the beneficiaries to
41. Id. at 397, 143 S.E.2d at 859.
42. 226 Va. 582, 311 S.E.2d 108 (1984).
43. Id. at 585, 311 S.E.2d at 110.
44. Id. at 584, 311 S.E.2d at 109.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 585, 311 S.E.2d at 110.
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consent where some remainder beneficiaries could not be deter-
mined until the remarriage or death of the life beneficiary.4'
The Claflin Doctrine was again upheld as recently as 1990 by
the Supreme Court of Virginia in Landmark Communications,
Inc. v. Sovran Bank, NA" Here, the beneficiaries argued that
they possessed vested remainders, and the trust should be ter-
minated by the joint demand of all trust beneficiaries. They
maintained that although the trust provided that it was to
terminate on the death of the last income beneficiary, there
was no requirement that the trust continue until that time.49
The beneficiaries relied upon the rules in LaPrade and
Schmucker that a trust may be prematurely terminated where
"(1) the settlor did not express a contrary intent in the
document, and (2) all the beneficiaries concurred in the demand
for termination."" The court, however, found that neither
requirement was met in this case. It stated that the testator's
intent clearly indicated that the trust terminate at no time
other than "[u]pon the death of all income beneficiaries."5'
Finally, as in Schmucker, the court held that all beneficiaries
could not possibly join in the demand of termination because
they could not all be identified until the death of the last
income beneficiary.52
B. Virginia Parts Company with the Claflin Doctrine
In 1991, the Virginia General Assembly passed emergency
legislation entitled Petition for Reformation of Trust," which if
read literally seems to overturn the Claflin Doctrine. This stat-
ute effectively allows "a trustee, personal representative or
beneficiary" to petition for the amendment of a trust, "in-
cluding... terminating the trust and ordering distribution of
47. Id. at 586, 311 S.E.2d at 110.
48. 239 Va. 158, 387 S.E.2d 484 (1990).




53. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.4 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
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the trust property regardless of any spendthrift or similar pro-
tective provision. " 4
As previously discussed in the Introduction, the only require-
ment for such termination is that good cause be shown.55 The
statute fails to require any consideration of the settlor's intent,
the material purposes of the trust, or the interests of the bene-
ficiaries which may be negatively affected by such termination.
In fact, the statute specifically addresses these considerations
for any amendment other than termination. According to the
statute, before amending a trust in any way other than termi-
nation, "the court must first find that ... such action will
neither (i) materially impair the accomplishment of the trust
purposes nor (ii) adversely affect the interests of any beneficia-
ry."56 By exempting termination from these requirements, "the
statute parts company with the Claflin Rule... which pre-
cludes termination that would (i) defeat a testator's (settlor's)
material purpose, or (ii) adversely affect the interests of any
non-consenting beneficiary." 7
Since the showing of good cause is the only hurdle to be
overcome in cases of trust termination, it is necessary to exam-
ine what is required to show good cause. According to the
statute,
good cause may be shown by evidence of (i) changes in any
federal or Virginia tax laws, or the construction of such
laws, whether by statute, court decision, regulation, ruling
or otherwise, which, in the absence of reformation, would
materially impair the purposes of the trust or adversely
affect the interests of the trustor or any beneficiary, or
which, if reformation were made, would materially benefit
the trust or the interests of the trustor or any beneficiary
or (ii) existing circumstances such that the purposes of the
trust will be impaired or the interests of the trustor or any
beneficiary adversely affected if the reformation is not made
or that reformation if made would benefit the trust or inter-
ests of the trustor or any beneficiary .... [In addition, good
54. Id. § 55-19.4(A).
55. Id.
56. Id. § 55-19.4(B).
57. Johnson, supra note 10, at 931-32 n.40; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS, supra note 4.
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cause may be shown by] evidence that [(iii)] the costs of
administration are such that the establishment or the con-
tinuance of the trust would impair the purposes of the trust
or [(iv)] the value of the trust principal is $25,000 or less,
with no expectation of additions to the principal other than
from interest or other earnings.58
In short, as Professor Johnson has said, this requirement of
good cause "reduces to no more than a finding 'that reformation
if made would benefit.., the trustor or any beneficiary."'
This is a relatively loose requirement which may be met easily.
For example, a beneficiary's showing that they could benefit
financially from the termination of a trust would satisfy the
requirement.
The primary purpose of this statute was probably to allow for
the amendment or termination of trusts where changes in tax
laws or other circumstances may have caused hardship under
the original trust instrument. A literal reading of it, however,
allows beneficiaries merely to disregard the settlor's intent and
terminate the trust to serve their own purposes. Although the
General Assembly probably did not intend for the statute to be
used that way, it has provided a tool for beneficiaries, empow-
ering them to disregard the settlor's intent and thereby over-
turn the Claflin Doctrine in Virginia.
An additional effect of a literal reading of this statute is that
spendthrift trusts are no longer effective in Virginia as valid re-
straints on alienation. As previously mentioned, the statute
allows termination "regardless of any spendthrift or similar
protective provision."" This directly contradicts the American
majority view that spendthrift trusts are indestructible, as
beneficiaries cannot compel the trustee to terminate such a
trust prematurely.6'
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.4(D)(1)-(2) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
59. Johnson, supra note 10, at 931 n.39 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.4(D)(1)
(Cun. Supp. 1991)).
60. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.4(A) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 31.
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C. Affirmation of the Claflin Doctrine by Herndon v.
Chesapeake National Bank
Although the mischief previously described could very well
result from a literal reading of the trust amendment and termi-
nation statute, this was not the result in a recent decision
regarding this statute, a case of first impression in Virginia.
Fortunately, the judge in this case had a good understanding of
the Claflin Doctrine and Virginia trust law. In Herndon v.
Chesapeake National Bank, 2 Mary Herndon, the testator, cre-
ated a spendthrift trust for the benefit of her son David. Upon
his death, the proceeds were to be paid to his issue. At the age
of fifty-six, David and his two children, ages twenty-five and
twenty-one, joined in a petition to terminate the trust." The
trustee, Chesapeake National Bank, and the guardian ad litem
(appointed to represent the interests of unborn or unascertained
beneficiaries) opposed the termination.'
The beneficiaries contended that they had good cause for
trust termination because it would benefit them, and their
interests would be adversely affected if the trust were not ter-
minated. Specifically, if termination were allowed, David would
use the proceeds to build a waterfront home in Lancaster Coun-
ty. He contended that this home would appreciate in value at a
greater rate than the securities which comprised the trust es-
tate.65 The court construed good cause narrowly, stating that
"[u]nless the impairment, if the trust is not terminated, or the
benefit, if it is, is reasonably apparent, absent some other spe-
cial circumstance set forth in the statute, this court concludes
good cause will not have been shown."66
The court then proceeded to weigh the different interpreta-
tions of the statute. The beneficiaries argued for a literal inter-
pretation of the statute, overturning the common law Claflin
Doctrine. The trustee, however, argued that "the statute was
designed to provide a practical remedy in cases where changes
62. 33 Va. Cir. 152 (Lancaster County 1994).
63. Id. at 152.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 153.
66. Id.
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in federal or state tax laws adversely affect an existing trust, or
where other special or unusual circumstances indicate that
reformation or termination is clearly in the best interests of the
trust or its beneficiaries." 7 The court construed the statute
narrowly in accordance with the view advocated by the trustee.
Upholding the Claflin Doctrine and addressing the problem
recognized by Professor Johnson, the court stated,
[t]estamentary intent has long been a "hallowed con-
cept" ... in this Commonwealth. Our citizens are entitled
to plan their estates, and their lawyers must be able to give
estate planning advice with confidence. To adopt the
petitioners' construction of this statute would seem to im-
peril the ability of both testators and lawyers to establish
trusts and plan estates with reasonable assurance that
their intentions will be carried out.68
Although this decision gives an excellent analysis of the pos-
sible mischief resulting from a literal interpretation of the stat-
ute, it has no precedential value outside of its circuit. There-
fore, the statute may still prove dangerous in the hands of a
judge who is literalist and lacks experience in Virginia trust
law. As a result, remedial legislation is necessary to correct this
problem.
D. Danger of Uncertainty and Further Erosion of the Claflin
Doctrine by In re Estate of Morton Diamond
As of September 1, 1995, pleadings have been filed in the
Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia for In re Estate of
Morton Diamond,69 a case which is most definitely a threat to
the Claflin Doctrine due to its equitable issues. In this case,
Morton Diamond, the settlor and testator, died unexpectedly on
July 15, 1994 during divorce proceedings with his second wife
Sharon Diamond. Since the divorce was not yet final, he had
failed to change his will which named Sharon as trustee and
67. Id. at 154.
68. Id. (quoting Johnson, supra note 10, at 932).
69. No. 54571 (Fairfax County filed Mar. 10, 1995).
70. Petition for Reformation of a Trust at 1-2, In re Estate of Morton Diamond,
No. 54571 (Fairfax County filed Mar. 10, 1995).
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life beneficiary of a Unified Credit Shelter Trust created for
estate tax purposes.7' In fact, his will leaves his entire estate
minus this trust, arguably more than one million dollars, to
Sharon Diamond. Mr. Diamond's daughters from his first mar-
riage, Jacquie Zuvich and Susan Moreines, were named, togeth-
er with any grandchildren of Mr. Diamond, as the remainder
beneficiaries of this trust, which was to terminate upon
Sharon's death.72
The daughters brought this suit in order to terminate the
trust and distribute the $600,000 in proceeds to them as the
remainder beneficiaries.73 In fact, their Petition states that
"[c]learly, the cross-claims of cruelty in the divorce petition, and
the mere filing of the divorce petition, indicate that it is not in
the Testator's best interest, nor in the Petitioners'
(beneficiaries') best interest, to have the unified credit shelter
trust continue."74 Moreover, Petitioners allege that it would not
be the Testator's intent for Sharon Diamond to inherit his es-
tate.75
In her Answer, Sharon Diamond denies that the Testator
would not have intended that she inherit his estate, as directed
by his will.76 In addition, she further denies that trust termi-
nation would be in the beneficiaries' best interests, since such
potential beneficiaries include Mr. Diamond's grandchildren, or
Petitioners' own prospective children, who are currently unborn
and unascertained. 7
Given these facts, one could argue that the intent of a testa-
tor can only be ascertained by the testator's will, especially
where the will and trust were obviously designed to achieve a
particular estate tax result. However, this is the very type of
case which may invite judges to interpret the Virginia statute
literally, merely to achieve a more equitable result for the par-
ties. The daughters here could certainly be viewed as having a
71. Id. at 2.
72. Id. at 2-3.
73. Id. at 3.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Respondent's Answer at 3, In re Estate of Morton Diamond, No. 54571
(Fairfax County filed Mar. 10, 1995).
77. Id.
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noble purpose for the proposed trust termination. In fact, it
could be argued that their primary motivation is to preserve
their father's actual intent, not to serve their own selfish pur-
poses. Since the settlor's intent provides the backbone for the
Claflin Doctrine itself, it is possible that a judge may mistaken-
ly believe that he or she is actually adhering to the Claflin
Doctrine by using the Virginia statute to terminate the trust in
order to achieve the settlor's "true" intent for equitable reasons.
Such a result is even more likely here, where the daughters'
interests are in direct conflict with those of the trustee, their
father's second wife, who is not their mother and probably does
not have their best interests at heart.
The fact remains, however, that the Testator's "true" intent
can never be ascertained since he has been forever silenced. It
is entirely possible that Mr. Diamond and his wife may have
reached a reconciliation before the divorce was actually final.
Therefore, his will and estate plan are the best existing evi-
dence of his intent and should be preserved. If the Virginia
statute is used effectively to terminate the trust in this case,
such a result would be in derogation of not only the Claflin
Doctrine but the traditional common law of wills as well. Final-
ly, as the Respondent argues, it is certainly not in the unborn
and unascertained beneficiaries' best interests for the trust to
be terminated and distributed to the current remainder benefi-
ciaries." Therefore, although the daughters may argue that
their father did not intend for his estranged wife to inherit his
estate, can they effectively show that he intended for his
grandchildren to be deprived of any trust proceeds, even where
he specifically mentioned them as beneficiaries?
Furthermore, under the Virginia statute as currently written,
the Testator's intent is irrelevant regarding a petition for termi-
nation. Instead, the proper argument in such a case is that the
termination would benefit the trustor or beneficiaries. There-.
fore, by arguing Testator's intent, the daughters are attempting
to argue Claflin Doctrine principles under the very part of the
statute which has disregarded the Claflin Doctrine. Such an
argument is misplaced and provides an illustration of the confu-
sion caused by this statute.
78. Id.
19951 1249
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1235
The danger of this case lies in the fact that the required
showing of good cause in the Virginia statute is so vaguely
defined. A judge who desires a certain equitable result may be
inclined to find that such a case presents the very type of good
cause or hardship which the statute was designed to overcome.
This illustrates the inherent danger of the Virginia statute and
the necessity for immediate legislative attention by the General
Assembly.
E. Spendthrift Trusts in Virginia
Spendthrift trusts, as previously explained, protect beneficia-
ries from their own improvidence and from the claims of their
creditors. This is achieved by making the trust property in
question both voluntarily and involuntarily inalienable. Consis-
tent with the English common law rule in favor of alienability,
such trusts were invalid in Virginia prior to 1919."9 Before
that time, the Code of Virginia provided that all trust interests
were subject to the debts of beneficiaries. 0
In 1919, however, the Code was revised to read:
[Alny such estate, not exceeding one hundred thousand
dollars in actual value, may be holden or possessed in trust
upon condition that the corpus thereof and income there-
from, or either of them, shall be applied by the trustee to
the support and maintenance of the beneficiaries without
being subject to their liabilities or to alienation by them;
but no such trust shall operate to the prejudice of any ex-
isting creditor of the creator of such trust.8'
According to this language, the trust's purpose had to be limit-
ed to the support and maintenance of the beneficiary for its
spendthrift features to be valid.
In 1934, however, the Supreme Court of Virginia read sup-
port and maintenance in a very broad manner. In Sheridan v.
79. James P. Witt, Spendthrift Trusts in Virginia-The "Support and Mainte-
nance" Requirement, VA. LAW., Jan. 1994, at 65.
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 2428 (1887).
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 5157 (1919); Witt, supra note 79, at 65.
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Krause,82 the trust directed that the trustee distribute income
"as [the trustee] may consider proper."' The court held that
although the purpose of the trust was not limited to providing
for the beneficiary's support and maintenance, that purpose was
obviously the testator's dominant motive, given the surrounding
circumstances." The court then went on to interpret the
statute's support and maintenance language broadly, as not
establishing an absolute condition of support and maintenance,
but allowing spendthrift protection where such purposes are
foreseeable.' This broad reading of support and maintenance
was subsequently repeated in Rountree v. Lane86 and In re
Hersch"
The 1988 decision of Levey v. First Virginia Bank,88 by the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, threw doubt upon
the prior broad interpretations of support and maintenance. In
this case, the beneficiary was given an income interest with no
specified standard of support and maintenance. However, his
principal interest did include such a standard. 9 The court held
that the income interest was subject to creditors' claims, while
the principal interest was not.9"
The Virginia General Assembly responded to this decision by
amending the statute.9 The phrase "applied by the trustee to
the support and maintenance of beneficiaries" was replaced by
"paid to or applied by the trustee for the benefit of the benefi-
ciaries."9' Thus, it appears that the requirement of the support
and maintenance standard for spendthrift trusts has been effec-
tively removed. Some doubt remains, however, as there was a
statement in the legislation that it was "declaratory of existing
law."3 Regardless, spendthrift trusts are certainly valid in Vir-
82. 161 Va. 873, 172 S.E. 508 (1934).
83. Id. at 879, 172 S.E. at 509.
84. Id. at 885-87, 172 S.E. at 512.
85. Id.
86. 155 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1946).
87. 57 B.R. 667 (E.D. Va. 1986).
88. 845 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1988).
89. Id. at 82.
90. Id.
91. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19 (Repl. Vol. 1995).
92. 1989 Va. Acts ch. 600.
93. Id. at cl. 2.
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ginia; there is merely a question as to whether a support and
maintenance standard is needed to make them effective.
Given the validity of spendthrift trusts in Virginia, it follows
that the General Assembly did not purposely revoke the Claflin
Doctrine, as it is usually upheld where spendthrift trusts are
upheld, and vice versa. It would be contradictory, indeed, for
Virginia to support spendthrift trusts as valid restraints on
alienation, while effectively revoking the Claflin Doctrine in
order to return to the English common law rule. Spendthrift
trusts and the English rule are concepts in direct opposition to
each other which cannot co-exist and be applied consistently in
the same commonwealth. They are, in fact, mutually exclusive
concepts whose underlying philosophies are contradictory. The
current language of Virginia's statute, however, not only seems
to revoke the Claflin Doctrine, but also frustrates the effective-
ness of spendthrift trusts, as previously discussed, by allowing
their termination. At common law, such trusts were inherently
indestructible. Therefore, it is illogical for Virginia to support
spendthrift trusts as valid restraints on alienation, while strip-
ping them of their effectiveness by making them vulnerable to
termination, especially given that they are indestructible by
their very nature.
From all of these contradictory concepts which cannot ratio-
nally be applied together, it can only be surmised that the
General Assembly mistakenly excluded trust termination from
the requirements of the Claflin Doctrine. Otherwise, if the Gen-
eral Assembly had actually intended to revoke the Claflin Doc-
trine, it would have completely removed the Claflin language
from the statute. Instead, the language remains and effectively
applies to all trust amendments except terminations.
IV. LITERALIST INTERPRETATION OF A SIMILAR TRUST STATUTE
IN MISSOURI
A. The Missouri Statute
In opposition to the approach taken in Virginia, Missouri has
interpreted its trust amendment and termination statute literal-
1252
TRUST AMENDMENT AND TERMINATION
ly and has, thereby, repealed the Claflin Doctrine.94 In 1983,
the Missouri legislature adopted Missouri Revised Statute sec-
tion 456.590.2 which allows the court to amend or terminate a
trust where such amendment or termination will benefit the
disabled, minor, unborn and unascertained beneficiaries. The
statute provides,
[w]hen all of the adult beneficiaries who are not disabled
consent, the court may, upon finding that such variation
will benefit the disabled, minor, unborn and unascertained
beneficiaries, vary the terms of a private trust so as to
reduce or eliminate the interests of some beneficiaries and
increase those of others, to change the times or amounts of
payments and distributions to beneficiaries, or to provide
for termination of the trust at a time earlier or later than
that specified by the terms. 5
This language requiring a benefit is comparable to Virginia's
statute which requires a showing that the amendment would
benefit the trustor or any beneficiary.
B. Interpretation of the Missouri Statute by Hamerstrom v.
Commerce Bank of Kansas City96
In Hamerstrom, the testator, Erle Smith, created a trust with
Elizabeth Hamerstrom as a life beneficiary. The trust was to
provide monthly payments of $150 to her and to be terminated
upon her death or when the proceeds were exhausted, whichev-
er came first. Upon her death, the proceeds were to be distrib-
uted to her husband if he survived her, or else in equal shares
to her two sons or the survivor of them.97 Mrs. Hamerstrom
requested that her monthly payment be increased from $150 to
$2000 due to unforeseen changes in her family's economic and
personal circumstances, including inflation, her husband's re-
tirement, and increases in health care costs.98  Mrs.
94. Becky 0. Kilpatrick, Note, Missouri Takes a Stand: The Death of the Dead
Hand in the Control of Trusts? Hamerstrom v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City, 57
Mo. L. REV. 1003 (1992).
95. MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.590.2 (Vernon 1992).
96. 808 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
97. Id. at 435.
98. Id.
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Hamerstrom's husband and her two sons consented to her re-
quest. Although the trustee neither opposed nor supported the
request, the guardian ad litem (appointed to protect the rights
of the unascertained and unborn beneficiaries) opposed the
request.9
The trial court denied Mrs. Hamerstrom's request, holding
that the unnamed, unborn issue of her sons were beneficiaries
and that the proposed deviation failed to benefit them as Mis-
souri Revised Statute section 456.590.2 requires.0 ° The Mis-
souri Court of Appeals for the Western District reversed and re-
manded with directions to grant the deviation,'0 ' stating that
the term beneficiary only applied to those persons expressly
identified by the testator.' The court also held that the
statute allows deviation from the terms of a private trust when
all expressly identified beneficiaries are adults who consent and
are sui juris.'0 ' With this holding, the court adopted the Eng-
lish rule of trust amendment and termination, with no regard
for the settlor's intent or the material purposes of the trust. In
so doing, the court has effectively overturned the Claflin Doc-
trine in Missouri.
According to Professor Wiedenbeck,0 4 there are three inter-
pretive issues which the Missouri statute fails to address. First,
where, there are no disabled, minor, unborn or unascertained
beneficiaries of the trust does a court have jurisdiction to ap-
prove a proposed amendment or termination where all other
beneficiaries consent?' ° Second, in deciding whether disabled,
minor, unborn or unascertained beneficiaries will benefit where
they do exist in a give case, will the court consider whether the
amendment or termination is consistent with the settlor's un-
derlying purposes imposed through conditions or restrictions in
99. Id.
100. Id. The trial court relied upon the Claflin Doctrine to support its holding,
stating that deviation was not permitted where the settlor's material purpose would
be frustrated. Id. at 437.
101. Id. at 439.
102. Id. at 438.
103. Id.
104. Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Missouri's Repeal of the Claflin Doctrine-New View of
the Policy Against Perpetuities?, 50 MO. L. REV. 805 (1985).
105. Kilpatrick, supra note 94, at 1010 (citing Wiedenbeck, supra note 104, at
813).
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the trust?... Finally, will the court consider the settlor's mate-
rial purposes in its decision? 7 The first and third issues were
addressed by the Hamerstrom court.
With regard to the first issue, because the language of the
Missouri statute does not provide for the contingency where no
disabled, minor, unborn or unascertained beneficiaries exist, it
is uncertain whether a court would have the jurisdiction to
amend or terminate a trust in such a case. The Hamerstrom
court, however, did not view this as a problem, but merely
stated that the statute authorizes courts to amend or terminate
a trust with the consent of all adult beneficiaries who are not
disabled, even where no other protected beneficiaries are identi-
fiable. 0
8
The Hamerstrom court addressed the third issue by resound-
ingly adopting the English common law rule established in
Saunders v. Vautier'° that where all adult beneficiaries who
are not disabled consent, they must compel termination of a
trust regardless of any frustration of the settlor's material pur-
poses. The Hamerstrom court stated that, "[t]he statute pro-
vides a mechanism for 'adult beneficiaries who are not disabled'
to vary, extend or eliminate a trust under circumstances where
the settlor's purpose is not considered.""0 In fact, the only re-
maining difference between the Missouri statute and the Eng-
lish rule is that Missouri requires judicial approval of the
amendment or termination."' "Whether courts will completely
ignore the settlor's intent in authorizing changes will probably
depend on the particular circumstances of each case and the
courts' willingness to shake seventy-seven years of precedent.
The possibility also exists that a settlor's intent will play an
implicit role in a court's decision-making process."" This is
certainly true, as the Herndon court construed the Virginia




108. Hamerstrom, 808 S.W.2d at 436, 438.
109. 49 Eng. Rep. 282, affd, 41 Eng. Rep. 482 (1841).
110. Hamerstrom, 808 S.W.2d at 438.
111. See Wiedenbeck, supra note 104, at 813-14.
112. Kilpatric&, supra note 94, at 1015.
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It was not necessary for the Hamerstrom court to reach the
second issue regarding the requirement of a benefit to disabled,
minor, unborn or unascertained beneficiaries, because the court
determined that such a protected class did not exist in that
case. When this issue is finally addressed, though, the following
two questions must be answered regarding how benefit will be
defined:
1. Does the benefit that the court is required by statute
to find include only pecuniary benefit or can it include
indirect, non pecuniary benefits created by the variation?
2. Should the court take into account the purposes of the
settlor in determining benefit to the protected class, or
should it base its decision exclusively on the court's evalua-
tion of the best interests of the beneficiaries, uninfluenced
by the settlor's purpose?...
If Missouri courts continue to follow the English rule, the
definition of benefit, addressed in the first question, could be
construed quite broadly. English courts have gone so far as to
include social and psychological benefits to the protected class
as a basis for approving trust amendment and termination." 4
Regarding the second question, English courts only view the
settlor's purpose as a background issue to be taken into ac-
count. They do not consider it at all controlling, especially
where the beneficiaries' interests outweigh its consideration."
Given the decision in Hamerstrom with its broad construction
and literal application of the statute, it is likely that Missouri
courts will continue to follow the English rule and to disregard
the Claflin Doctrine.
C. Other States with Trust Amendment and Termination
Statutes
Aside from Virginia and Missouri, other states which permit
courts, upon petition, to amend trusts or terminate them pre-
113. Kilpatrick, supra note 94, at 1016 (citing Wiedenbeck, supra note 104, at 815-
20).
114. Kilpatrick, supra note 94, at 1016 (citing Wiedenbeck, supra note 104, at 818-
19).
115. Kilpatrick, supra note 94, at 1016 (citing Wiedenbeck, supra note 104, at
823).
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maturely include California, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Wisconsin." 6 Therefore, regardless of how these statutes are
interpreted, these states are the minority, and the Claflin Doc-
trine remains the American majority rule.
V. COMMENT ON POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. Comparison of Virginia and Missouri Cases
The previous discussion of the Hamerstrom" case illus-
trates the damage that can be done to the common law Claflin
Doctrine if these types of remedial statutes are interpreted
literally. If it is true that the legislatures intended these stat-
utes as tools to alleviate hardship, then they must be narrowly
construed in order to be effective and still maintain the Claflin
Doctrine.
The Herndon" case in Virginia provides an excellent exam-
ple of how a judge, who is knowledgeable in the trust area, can
apply the statute narrowly and, thereby, maintain respect for
the settlor's intent and material purposes. The Herndon court
defined good cause and benefit very narrowly so that the trust
would be terminated only in cases where the hardship or bene-
fit was "reasonably apparent."" In this way, beneficiaries
cannot merely defy the settlor's intent because they desire the
trust proceeds prior to termination. The court successfully ap-
plied the statute by. using the Claflin Doctrine as a background
for its analysis. In effect, the court considered the settlor's in-
tent and material purposes in its definitions of good cause and
benefit. This is one possible solution for how a court may recon-
cile this type of statute with the Claflin Doctrine.
If this solution were applied in a case like Hamerstrom, ex-
cept in this example, assume there is a class of protected bene-
ficiaries, then it would be unnecessary to repeal the Claflin
Doctrine in such a case. For example, the statute there re-
116. Adam J. Hirsch & William KS. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead
Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 51 n.205 (1992).
117. Hamerstrom v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City, 808 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1991).
118. Herndon v. Chesapeake Nat'l Bank, 33 Va. Cir. 152 (Lancaster County 1994).
119. Id. at 153.
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quired that the court find that any amendment or termination
would "benefit the disabled, minor, unborn and unascertained
beneficiaries."" ° The court could construe benefit narrowly in
a case where there was a protected class of beneficiaries. In
this way, the court would use the Claflin Doctrine as the basis
for how it defines benefit and how it analyzes the types of
amendment or termination that would not frustrate the settlor's
intent or material purposes. Thus, only in cases where the
hardship or the benefit was so great that the settlor themselves
would have desired amendment or termination would the court
allow it. This presents a further problem, however, as illustrat-
ed in Estate of Morton Diamond," where it is sometimes dif-
ficult to ascertain whether the settlor would have desired
amendment or termination.
B. Legislative Solution in Virginia
Although the above solution provides a method for reconciling
the statutes with the Claflin Doctrine, it is imperfect because
there is no guarantee that any given judge will possess the
requisite knowledge to apply such a solution. In Virginia, the
General Assembly must remedy this problem through legisla-
tion to prevent any further mischief. In fact, all that is neces-
sary is to remove the phrase "other than termination" from the
sentence "[i]n the case of any reformation other than termina-
tion, such action will neither (i) materially impair the accom-
plishment of the trust purposes nor (ii) adversely affect the
interests of any beneficiary."2 This is the only way to ensure
that the Claflin Doctrine will continue to protect the settlor's
intent and material purposes, and that the trust will remain a
stable device for the transfer of property in Virginia.
C. An Equitable Solution
Where remedial legislation is not possible, this solution pres-
ents a compromise which satisfies the beneficiary while effectu-
120. MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.590.2 (Vernon 1992).
121. In re Estate of Morton Diamond, No. 54571 (Fairfax County filed Mar. 10,
1995).
122. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.4(B)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1995).
1258
TRUST AMENDMENT AND TERMINATION
ating the settlor's intent. In cases where the remainder benefi-
ciary wants the trust terminated prematurely, and the life
tenant has disclaimed their interest and consented to trust
termination, an equitable solution may be for the court to make
the remainder beneficiary an income beneficiary (in place of the
life tenant) until the proper termination date of the trust.'
At that time, if the remainder beneficiary is still living, he or
she will take possession of the trust property that is rightfiully
his or hers. If he or she is dead, however, this approach allows
the alternate remainder beneficiary to take possession of the
trust property upon the trust's original termination date, as the
settlor intended. In this way, the alternate remainder beneficia-
ry will not be excluded, as they would have been if the trust
were terminated prematurely. As a result, the settlor's intent
will be maintained, especially in cases where all remainder
beneficiary have not yet been ascertained until the designated
termination date. This solution protects the interests of unborn,
unascertained beneficiaries, while effecting the settlor's intent
regarding their expressed termination date. In addition, the
remainder beneficiary can enjoy an income interest in the
meantime. Trust termination statutes may also be amended to
take advantage of this equitable solution. It should be noted,
though, that this solution is only possible in limited situations.
But, in those limited situations, it provides a method to ap-
pease the remainder beneficiary temporarily, without having to
actually terminate the trust prematurely.
VI. CONCLUSION
This comment has provided an overview of the possible prob-
lems created by the trust amendment and termination statute
in Virginia. The Claflin Doctrine, which honors the settlor's
intent and material purposes, has long been the majority rule
in Virginia for good reason. A settlor or testator has every right
to dispose of their own property as they wish. Because trusts
have become so prevalent as a substitute for wills, it follows
that a settlor's intent for a trust should be protected to the
123. See Patricia J. Roberts, The Acceleration of Remainders: Manipulating the
Identity of the Remaindermen, 42 S.C. L. REV. 295, 321 (1991).
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same extent as a testator's intent for a will. The Claflin Doc-
trine has accomplished this in Virginia and has assured that
trusts remain stable devices for the transfer of property.
The Virginia trust amendment and termination statute, how-
ever, has placed this stability in jeopardy. With its apparent
disregard for the Claflin Doctrine, the statute has provided
beneficiaries with a tool to serve their own purposes. Virginia
estate planners cannot confidently assure their clients that the
material purposes of their trusts will be carried out until this
statute is amended through remedial legislation. Meanwhile,
estate planners can only hope that courts will continue to apply
the statute as the Herndon court has done. Of course, there is
no guarantee that other courts will exhibit the insight and sen-
sitivity to the trust issues that the court did in Herndon.
Moreover, as recognized by Professor Johnson, it is ironic
that the very title of the Virginia statute, Petition for Reforma-
tion of Trust, refers to reformation, "a well-recognized common
law remedy for accomplishing original intent."' Reformation
is "[a] court-ordered correction of a written instrument to cause
it to reflect the true intentions of the parties."" At first
glance, one might think Virginia's trust statute, with its refer-
ence to reformation, would accomplish the amendment or termi-
nation of a trust in order to better reflect the settlor's true
intent.
In fact, the use of the term reformation in the statute's title
merely serves to bolster the belief that the Virginia General
Assembly intended the statute as a means to alleviate hard-
ship. For example, where tax laws have changed, such that the
original purposes of a trust cannot be accomplished as it is
currently written, the court may reform the trust in order to
accomplish the original intent of the settlor in light of the new
tax laws. In this sense, the amendment or termination of a
trust could be viewed as a reformation, because it would be
accomplished with the sole purpose of achieving the settlor's
original intent. This is most likely the scenario the General
Assembly had in mind when it enacted Virginia's statute.
124. Johnson, supra note 10, at 933 n.47
125. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1281 (6th ed. 1990).
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Unfortunately, though, if given a literal interpretation, the
statute may serve as a tool for trust beneficiaries to defy the
settlor's intent. This certainly does not qualify as reformation.
In reality, the settlor's intent is completely disregarded by the
Virginia statute in cases of termination, accomplishing nothing
more than the derogation of the Claflin Doctrine and the ero-
sion of the trust as a stable device for the transfer of property.
Jessica L. Lacey

